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TESTING HEALTH CARE WORKERS FOR AIDS:
PUBLIC NECESSITY OR PRIVATE INTRUSION?
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome ("AIDS")' has spread
dramatically since its discovery in 1981,2 making it one of the
greatest health concerns of the decade.' AIDS develops from the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV")4 and is characterized by
See Mary E. Chamberland & James W. Curran, Epidemiology and Prevention of AIDS and
HIV Infection, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INFECTiOUS DISEASES 1029, 1030 (Gerald L.
Mandell et al. eds., 3d ed. 1990) [hereinafter INFECTIOuS DISEASES] (medical name given to
disease characterized by occurrence of rare and opportunistic infections in patients with
suppressed immune systems is AIDS); see also Disease and Trauma Reviews, 70th ed., 1991,
available in LEXIS, Medex Library, MEDEX File [hereinafter Trauma Reviews] (same).
Opportunistic infections are diseases which only occur in persons with weakened immune
systems. See Kenneth H. Mayer, The Clinical Challenges of AIDS and HIV Infection, 14 LAW
MED & HEALTHCARE 281, 282 (1986). The occurrence of opportunistic infections in an
immunologically deficient system is AIDS. Nancy Mueller, The Epidemiology of the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 14 LAW MED. & HEALTHCARE 250, 250 (1987). Pneumocys-
tis carinni pneumonia and Karposi's Sarcoma are two types of opportunistic diseases which
inflicted several homosexual men in the early 1980's. Karposi's Sarcoma & Pneumocystis
Pneumonia Among Homosexual Men in New York City and California, 30 MORBIDITY & MOR-
TALITY WKLY. REP. 305, 305 (1981). The men were later diagnosed as having AIDS. Id.
Researchers concluded that since the persons inflicted "had previously been healthy and
apparently immunologically normal, their striking immune defect had to be acquired." Ma-
thilde Krim, AIDS: The Challenge to Science and Medicine, in AIDS: THE EMERGING ETHICAL
DILEMMAS, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 1, 3 (Supp. Aug. 1985).
' See Arnold S. Relman, Introduction to AIDS: The Emerging Ethical Dilemmas, 15 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 1, I (Supp. Aug. 1985). Near the end of 1981 a new disease was recognized
and the Centers for Disease Control suggested it be called Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome. Id.
3 See The HIVIAIDS Epidemic: The First 10 Years, 265 JAMA 3228, 3228 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter HIVIAIDS Epidemic] (citing In Point of Fact, Geneva: World Health Organization (World
Health Organization), May 1991 (no.74)). Today, there are an estimated one million per-
sons infected with HIV in the United States and 627 million infected throughout the
world. Id. The World Health Organization estimates approximately eight to ten million
adults and I million children are infected with HIV worldwide. Id.; Jeffrey S. Dover, Cuta-
neous Manifestations of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection; Part 1, 127 ARCH DERMATOL
A.M.A 1383, 1383-91 (Sept. 1991) (statistics of HIV outbreak).
AIDS is a fatal disease; no one diagnosed with the disease has survived. See Charles R.
Horsburgh, Jr. et al., Preventive Strategies in Sexually Transmitted Diseases for the Primary Care
Physician, 258 JAMA 815, 818 (1987). Studies indicate that by the end of 1992 approxi-
mately 263,000 people will have died of AIDS. See Trauma Reviews, supra note 2. Further,
by the year 2000, an additional fifteen to twenty million infected persons will suffer the
same fate. HIVIAIDS Epidemic, supra, at 3228.
Currently AIDS is the second leading cause of death among men between twenty-two
and forty-four years old; it will soon become one of the five leading causes of death among
women between fifteen and forty-four years old. Mortality Attributable to HIV Infec-
tion-United States 1981-1991, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 41, 41-44 (1991).
See Robert C. Gallo et al., Frequent Detection and Isolation of Cytopathic Retrovirus
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a severe impairment of the human immune system.5 HIV is pri-
marily transmitted through intimate sexual contact, exposure to
AIDS-infected blood and intravenous drug use.6 Several investiga-
(HTLVIII) from Patients with AIDS and at Risk for AIDS, 224 SCIENCE 500, 500-02 (1984)
(HIV virus primary cause of AIDS); John Coffin, Letter to the Editor, Human Immu-
nodeficiency Viruses, 232 SCIENCE 697, 697 (1986) (several members of Subcommittee on
Human Retroviruses of International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses recommended
virus be called Human Immunodeficiency Virus). See generally Sheldon H. Landesman et
al., Special Report: The AIDS Epidemic, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 521, 522 (1985). The enzyme
linked immunosorbent assay test ("ELISA") is employed to detect the presence of HIV or
AIDS. Id.
' See Jean Marx, Clue Found to T Cell Loss in AIDS, 254 SCIENCE 798, 798-800 (1991)
(discussing possible causes of suppression of immune system in AIDS patients).
AIDS alters the T-lymphocytes or the white blood cells that build the human immune
system. See Krim, supra note 1, at 4. The AIDS virus multiplies in these cells and proceeds
to destroy them. Id. The virus transcribes its genetic material, RNA, into white blood cells
and subsequently alters the cell's function. Id.
' See Margaret A. Hamburg et al., Immunology of AIDS and HIV Infection, in INFECTIOUS
DISEASES, supra note 1, at 1046 (transmission "can occur through sexual contact, infected
blood products and from mother to infant"); Krim, supra note 1, at 4 (to be transmitted
from one person to another, HIV must virtually be injected into blood stream and "en-
counter cells in which it can multiply"): Mueller, supra note 1, at 256 (virus has been de-
tected in blood, saliva, tears, breast milk and semen); David D. Ho et al., Letter to the
Editor, Infrequency of Isolation of HTLV-III Virus from Saliva in AIDS, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1606, 1607 (1985) (higher risk of transmitting HIV through anal intercourse); Mads
Melbye et al., Letter to the Editor, Anal Intercourse as a Possible Factor in Heterosexual Trans-
mission of HTLV-III to Spouses of Hemophiliacs, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 857, 857 (1985) (same).
Statistically, the majority of AIDS victims are homosexuals, bisexuals and intravenous
drug users. Trauma Reviews, supra note 1. As of April 1991, there were a total of 168,913
cases of AIDS among adults and adolescents. Id. Fifty-nine percent of the victims were
either homosexual or bisexual, 22% were female and heterosexual male IV drug users, 5%
were persons who contracted AIDS through heterosexual contact, 2% were blood transfu-
sion recipients and 1% were hemophiliacs. Id.
The minority of victims include heterosexuals, see Nancy S. Padian et al., Female-to-Male
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 266 JAMA 1664, 1664 (1991) (four percent
of AIDS cases attributable to heterosexual contact with high-risk partners), and children
born to AIDS infected mothers. See Philippe Van De Perre et al., Postnatal Transmission of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I from Mother to Infant-A Prospective Cohort Study in
Kigali, Rwanda, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 593, 593 (1991). It is generally believed that mother
to infant transmission occurs during pregnancy or delivery. Id. In such cases the rate of
transmission is 10% to 52%. Id. Transmission via breast milk is also possible although this is
generally regarded as extremely rare. Id. It is believed that most perinatal transmissions
occur before or during child birth rather than afterwards. See Recommendations for Assisting
in the Prevention of Perinatal Transmission of Human Lymphotropic Virus Type IllLymphade-
nopathy-Associated Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTAL-
I1Y WKLY. REP. 721, 722 (1985); see alsoJanineJason, Breast Feeding in 1991, 325 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1036, 1037 (1991) (concern over transmission of HIV through breast milk height-
ened when mother has HIV infective risk factors). See generally Julie A. Menella & Gary K.
Beauchamp, The Transfer of Alcohol to Human Milk Effects on Flavor and the Infants Behavior,
325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 981, 982 (1991) (HIV has been detected in breast milk).
To date, no evidence has been established that would suggest that HIV can be transmit-
ted through the air or by casual skin contact. See Gerald H. Freidland et al., Lack of Trans-
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tions by the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") have docu-
mented transmission of HIV in the health care setting.7 The
mission of Contacts of Patients with Oral Candidiasis, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 344, 344 (1986)
(absent sexual contact, household contact poses minimal or no risk of transmission); C.
Everett Koop, Surgeon General's Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 256 JAMA
2784, 2784 (1984) (AIDS virus not transmitted by casual contact); Recommendations to
Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type 111/Lymphade-
nopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 681, 683-
94 (1985) Ihereinafter Workplace Recommendations] (infection from household contact not
yet detected).
Although AIDS can be transmitted in a variety of ways, "[tihe clinical syndrome of AIDS
follows infection with HIV after a variable, often prolonged, period of time." Richard E.
Chaisson & Paul A. Volberding, Clinical Manifestations of HIV Infection, in INFEcTIOus Dis-
EASES, supra note 1, at 1059, 1060. In the majority of cases, it takes about ten to fifteen
years after the infection for full blown AIDS to develop. Id.
I See Dennis L. Breo, Meet Kimberly Bergalis-the Patient in the 'Dental AIDS Case', 264
JAMA 2018, 2018 (1990) (naming Bergalis as patient who contracted AIDS from dentist);
Charles Marwick, Congressional AIDS Commission in Limelight, Likely to Remain Therefor An-
other Year, 266 JAMA 2050, 2050 (1991) (Bergalis apparently acquired infection during
molar extractions).
At least one commentator has written:
To date there has been only one documented report of HIV transmission from an
infected health care worker to patients. In that case, five patients became infected
with HIV after receiving care from an HIV-infected dentist; the mechanism of trans-
mission remains unclear. Current data indicate that the risk of HIV transmission
from health care workers to patients is so low that it cannot be measured accurately;
nonetheless, the potential for such transmission raises complex medical, ethical, legal
and social issues that have major public health implications.
Id.: Richard N. Danila et al., A Look Back Investigation of Patients of an HIV Infected Physician,
325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1406, 1406 (1991). The risk of transmission from health care work-
ers to patients is extremely low. See Albert B. Lowenfels & Gary Wormser, Letter to the
Editor, Risk of Transmission of HIV from Surgeon to Patient, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 888, 889
(1991). In discussing probabilities of injuries during surgical procedures and probabilities
of HIV transmission based on statistical data the authors state that where the HIV status of
a surgeon is unknown, there is "1 chance in 21 million per hour of surgery" that HIV will
be transmitted from surgeon to patient. Id. Where the surgeon is known to be HIV posi-
tive there is "approximately I chance in 83,000 per hour of surgery . I..." ld. Further,
"[olther factors altering the risk might be the length of the procedure, the number of
operators, [and the] type of operation, since some procedures appear to be associated with
an increased frequency of injury." Id.
Prior to the Kimberly Bergalis controversy, reports only documented transmission to
health care workers exposed to patients' infected blood. See Update: Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Infections in Health-Care Workers Exposed to Blood of Infected Patients, 36
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 285, 285-88 (1987) (evaluating and examining three
cases wherein health care workers developed AIDS from exposure to their patient's in-
fected blood); Rachel L. Stricof & Dale L. Morse, Letter to the Editor, HTLV-IIIILAV Ser-
oconversion Following a Deep Intra Muscular Needlestick Injury, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1115,
1115 (1986) (describing transmission of HIV to health care worker pricked by needle con-
taminated with blood of AIDS patient); Workplace Recommendations, supra note 6, at 683-94
(assessing risk of transmission between patients and health care workers). See generally 137
CONG. REc. H5, 495-01 (daily ed. July 16, 1991) (statement of Hon. Dannemeyer) ("records
of the [Centers for Disease Control] make clear that today 6,436 health care workers are
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tragic story of Kimberly Bergalis, the young woman who con-
tracted AIDS from her dentist, 8 inspired a national debate on
whether federal law should require mandatory AIDS testing of all
health care workers.9
This Note will examine the constitutional implications of AIDS
testing of health care workers. Part One will discuss recent federal
legislation requiring states to enact guidelines designed to prevent
transmission of HIV in the health care environment. Part Two
will address protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment
and suggest that AIDS testing of health care workers violates such
rights. Parts Three and Four will discuss the impact that subse-
quent disclosure of test results would likely have on a health care
worker's rights to privacy and equal protection, respectively. Part
Five will examine federal statutes which protect AIDS-infected
employees from discrimination. In conclusion, this Note will pro-
pose that in adopting guidelines, states must ensure that health
care workers' constitutional rights are not abridged.
I. PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND THE CDC GUIDELINES
In response to the discovery that Kimberly Bergalis had con-
tracted AIDS, several legislative proposals seeking to mandate
AIDS testing of all health care workers were introduced.
A. Legislation in Response to Kimberly Bergalis
On June 26, 1991, the Honorable William E. Dannemeyer
sponsored the Kimberly Bergalis Patient and Health Providers
Protection Act of 1991 ("Dannemeyer Bill") l" which directs the
infected with HIV").
See Possible Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus to a Patient During an Invasive
Dental Procedure, 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 489, 489-93 (1990) (two years
prior to AIDS diagnosis, victim had two teeth extracted by her dentist); see also Update:
Transmission of HIV Infection During an Invasive Dental Procedure-Florida, 40 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 21, 21-27 (1991) (analyzing dentist's medical history and dental
practice). See generally Fla. Dental Patient, 23, Dies of AIDS, NEWSDAY, December 9, 1991
(city ed.), at 4 (reporting Kimberly Bergalis' death on December 8, 1991).
See Jennifer L. Scott, Take Steps Against AIDS, NEWSDAY, Jan. 5, 1992 (Nassau ed.), at
31 (Bergalis' story stirred national debate). Congress responded to this debate by consider-
ing several legislative proposals calling for mandatory AIDS testing of health care workers).
See, e.g., infra notes 10-22 (discussing various proposals introduced).
"0 H.R. 2788 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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Secretary of the Health and Human Services to specify medical
and dental procedures that HIV-infected health care workers
should not perform." Under the Dannemeyer Bill, states would
be required to screen all health care workers who perform the
specified procedures for HIV or Hepatitis B.' 2 Any health care
worker testing positive for either disease would be prohibited
from performing further invasive procedures. 13 An exception to
this prohibition would allow health care workers to perform any
procedure if they fully disclosed their HIV status to their patients
and obtained the patients' written consent.' 4 The Dannemeyer
Bill would also permit physicians to test patients for HIV and
Hepatitis B provided there is reason to suspect they may be in-
fected with either disease."
In further response to the Kimberly Bergalis controversy, two
amendments to the Postal Service Appropriations Act ("PSAA")
were proposed.' 6 The first proposed amendment would make it a
federal crime for health care workers who knew they had AIDS to
perform exposure-prone invasive procedures without having ob-
tained their patient's prior written consent.' 7 Violation of the
amendment would result in the imposition of a $10,000 fine, a
minimum of 10 years incarceration, or both.' 8 The second pro-
posed amendment ("Amendment 781")"9 would require states to
adopt CDC guidelines or their equivalent.20
In October 1991, Congress passed Amendment No. 781 to the
PSAA, 2 rejecting all other aforementioned proposals. 2
" Memorandum from Mary McGrane & Howard Cohen to the Republican Members of
the Subcommittee on Health and Environment 3 (Sept. 17, 1991) [hereinafter
Memorandum].
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 H.R. 2622, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). A corollary proposal to amend the Judiciary
Appropriations Act ("JAA") would have allowed HIV testing of patients in order to pro-
tect health care workers. Id.
IS See id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
" See Editorial, Voluntary AIDS Testing-Protect Patients With Sensible Guidelines, SEATTLE
Timrs, Oct. 7, 1991, at A8. Describing Amendment No. 781, the editorial stated:
Congress' passage of a bill to encourage doctors, dentists and other health care
363
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B. The CDC Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of HIV
from Health Care Worker to Patient
Under Amendment No. 781, each state has one year to certify
to the Health and Human Services Department that it has imple-
mented the CDC recommendations23 or their equivalent. 4 Failure
to comply with this legislation would render a state ineligible to
receive federal aid under the Public Health Service Act. 25
In July 1991, the CDC issued recommendations in order to pre-
vent transmission of HIV from health care workers to their pa-
tients. 2' The CDC distinguished exposure-prone invasive proce-
workers to be tested for AIDS is a sensible retreat from a draconian, costly and
ineffective alternative passed by the Senate in July.
The Senate amendment sponsored by Jesse Helms, R-N.C., would have set a mini-
mum 10-year prison term for any medical professional who is infected with the
AIDS virus and does not notify his patients ....
The compromise law wisely rejects these tough-sounding but futile tactics, in favor
of voluntary testing.
Id.: see also Senator Hysteria, NEWSDAY, Oct. 8, 1991, at 50 (city ed.) (Congress refused to
mandate AIDS testing of health care workers, opting to let states chose between develop-
ing their own standards or adopting those developed by CDC).
11 See supra notes 10-22 (discussing various proposals prompted by Kimberly Bergalis
case).
23 See Second Supplement to the Democratic Study Group Legislative Report for the Week of
September 30, 1991, at 3, Oct. 2, 1991 [hereinafter "Second Supplement"); see also Editorial,
supra note 22, at A8 (states have one year to adopt CDC guidelines or develop their own).
24 See Second Supplement, supra note 23 at 3-4. It is up to the director of the CDC to
determine whether a particular state's guidelines are sufficiently equivalent to the CDC's to
meet the requirements of the legislation. Id. As of yet, Congress has not specified what the
content of "equivalent" guidelines should be. Id.
22 See Second Supplement, supra note 23, at 3. States have reacted differently to this
amendment. See David Zinman, NY Health Policy Ignites Protest, NEWSDAY, Oct. 10, 1991, at
39 (Nassau ed.). New York's Health Department does not recommend that patients be in-
formed that their doctor or dentist has AIDS as long as the review panel believes there is
no apparent risk of transmission. Id. Illinois, however, advocated a requirement that all
patients be informed if their health care worker had AIDS. Id. The recent change in posi-
tion by the CDC is favorable to New York's proposed action. See also B. D. Colen, Limits
Dropped on HIV Doctors, NEWSDAY, Dec. 5, 1991 (Nassau ed.), at 145.
"' Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepa-
titis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTAL-
ITY WKLY. REP. 1 (July, 1991) (Supp. No. RR-8, 5-6) [hereinafter Recommendations]. The
CDC Guidelines contain the following recommendations geared towards preventing trans-
mission of HIV and Hepatitis B from health care workers to patients:
[1] All HCWs should adhere to universal precautions, including the appropriate use
of hand washing, protective barriers, and care in the use and disposal of needles and
other sharp instruments. HCWs who have exudative lesions or weeping dermatitis
should refrain from all direct patient care and from handling patient-care equipment
and devices used in performing invasive procedures until the condition resolves.
HCWs should also comply with current guidelines for disinfection and sterilization
364
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dures from other medical activities, and suggested that health care
workers performing such procedures know their HIV status.2"
However, the CDC's recommendations specifically rejected
mandatory AIDS testing health care workers. It concluded that
the risk of transmission from health care worker to patients "does
not support the diversion of resources that would be required to
implement mandatory testing programs."28 The recommendations
do provide for the establishment of an expert review panel to ad-
vise HIV-positive health care workers as to which procedures they
would be permitted to perform with the informed consent of the
of reusable devices used in invasive procedures.
12] Currently available data provide no basis for recommendations to restrict the
practice of HCWs infected with HIV or HBV who perform invasive procedures not
identified as exposure-prone, provided the infected HCWs practice recommended
surgical or dental technique and comply with universal precautions and current rec-
ommendations for sterilization/disinfection.
[31 Exposure-prone procedures should be identified by medical/surgical/dental or-
ganizations and institutions at which the procedures are performed.
[4] HCWs who perform exposure-prone procdures should know their HIV antibody
status. HCWs who perform exposure-prone procedures and who do not have sero-
logic evidence of immunity to HBV from vaccination or from previous infection
should know their HBsAg status and, if that is positive, should also know their
HBeAg status.
[5] HCWs who are infected with HIV or HBV (and are Hbeag positive) should not
perform exposure-prone procedures unless they have sought counsel from an expert
review panel and been advised under what circumstances, if any, they may continue
to perform these procedures. [The review panel should include experts who re-
present a balanced perspective. Such experts might include all of the following: (a)
the HCW's personal physician(s), (b) an infectious disease specialist with expertise in
the epidemiology of HIV and HBV transmission, (c) a health professional with ex-
pertise in the procedures performed by the HCW, and (d) state or local public health
official(s). If the HCW's practice is institutionally based, the expert review panel
might also include a member of the infection-control committee, preferably a hospi-
tal epidemiologist. HCWs who perform exposure-prone procedures outside the hos-
pital/institutional setting should seek advice from appropriate state and local public
health officials regarding the review process. Panels must recognize the importance
of confidentiality and the privacy rights of infected HCWs.]
16] Mandatory testing of HCWs for HIV antibody, Hbsag, or Hbeag is not recom-
mended. The current assessment of the risk that infected HCWs will transmit HIV
or HBV to patients during exposure-prone procedures does not support the diver-
sion of resources that would be required to implement mandatory testing programs.
Compliance by HCWs with recommendations can be increased through education,
training, and appropriate confidentiality safeguards.
ld.
27 See Bernard Lo & Robert Steinbrook, Health Care Workers Infected With the Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus: The Next Steps, 267 JAMA 1100, 1101 (1992). Exposure-prone invasive
procedures are those which present a substantial risk of patients being exposed to their
health care worker's infected blood. Id.
28 Id.
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patient in question. 29
Many professional groups were opposed to the CDC's recom-
mendations because the risk of transmission from health care
worker to patient was minuscule." Moreover, no one in the medi-
cal community would agree to draft a list of exposure-prone inva-
sive procedures,31 and at least one professional group opined that
such a list would be "irrelevant and counterproductive" since such
procedures "cannot be defined in any scientific or rational way."132
Faced with this dissent, the CDC recently withdrew plans to list
such procedures and revised the guidelines to focus on the requi-
site skill and technique of HIV-positive health care workers rather
than listing the type of procedures they can perform. 3 According
to the new guidelines, the review panel would decide which proce-
dures an infected health care worker may perform on a case by
case basis.3 4 Prior written consent of patients, however, is re-
quired before an HIV-positive health care worker can perform
such invasive procedures. 5
In complying with Amendment 781, it is suggested that states
consider the impact their guidelines may have on a health care
worker's constitutional rights. The following three sections of this
Note will examine the constitutionality of mandatory AIDS test-
ing of a health care worker and disclosure of their positive test
results.
II. INVOLUNTARY TESTING: DOES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROVIDE A SHIELD?
The Fourth Amendment provides the "right of the people to
be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and
29 Id. at 1101-02.
30 Id. at 1102.
31 Id.
32 Id.
d.; see B. D. Colen, Limits Dropped on HIV Doctors, NEWSDAY, Dec. 5, 1991, at 145.
"After coming under attack from most of organized medicine and the AIDS community,
the federal Centers for Disease Control has [sic] reversed its position and decided to place
virtually no limitations on the medical practice of HIV-infected health care professionals."
Id.
3 See Lo & Steinbrook, supra note 27, at 1102.
38 See Lo & Steinbrook, supra note 27, at 1102.
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seizures "...36 The United States Supreme Court has held that
involuntary blood testing constitutes a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. 7 In determining whether mandatory
blood testing without probable cause or individualized suspicion is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, courts evaluate
whether the government's interest "is sufficiently compelling to
justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such
searches." 8
36 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
The goal of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individu-
als by requiring that all searches and seizures are reasonable and are conducted upon the
issuance of a warrant. See California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991) (searches
outside judicial process, without prior judicial approval, are per se unreasonable under
Fourth Amendment, subject to few delineated exceptions) (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 390 (1978)); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985). "The Fourth Amend-
ment protects expectations of privacy; an individual's expectations that in certain places
and at certain times he had the right to be let alone, the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men." Id. at 758; see also Horton v. United States, 110 S.
Ct. 2301, 2306 (1990) (search compromises individual's privacy interest) (citing United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 709-10
(1987) (Fourth Amendment protects government employees from having personal prop-
erty searched and taken, unless unreasonable because of operational realities); cf Acevedo,
Ill S. Ct. at 1992 (Scalia, J., concurring) (Fourth Amendment merely prohibits searches
and seizures that are unreasonable); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1472 (1985) (recognizing over twenty exceptions to warrant re-
quirement). See generally Rodney L. LaGrone & William W. Cook, Investigation and Police
Practices Overview of the Fourth Amendment, 78 GEO. L.J. 699, 700 (1990) (search is govern-
mental infringement upon privacy of individual); Donald J. McNeil & Laurie A. Spieler,
Mandatory Testing of Hospital Employees Exposed to the AIDS Virus: Need to Know or Unwar-
ranted Invasion of Privacy, 21 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 1039, 1057 (1990) (Fourth Amendment
provides protection against searches that interfere with individual's expectations of
privacy).
" See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966) (non-consensual taking of
blood sample from person convicted of driving under influence of alcohol did not violate
Fourth Amendment).
11 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989); see Skin-
ner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 619 (in determining whether search
is reasonable, courts weigh intrusion on individual's privacy against governmental interest
in conducting search); Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1193 (D.C. Cir.) (govern-
ment's interest in requiring drug testing of applicants for Justice Department jobs out-
weighs minimal invasion of privacy), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 669 (1991); Georgia Assoc. of
Educators v. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110, 1114 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (applying balancing test
from Treasury Employees, court concluded no specific compelling governmental interest was
identified).
367
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A. Mandatory AIDS Testing of Health Care Workers: Glover v. East-
ern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit addressed the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment
protects health care workers from involuntary AIDS testing in
Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation.9 In
Glover, employees of a multi-county health services agency
brought an action under the Fourth Amendment protesting
mandatory testing of health care workers for Hepatitis B and
HIV.40 The state agency defended mandatory AIDS testing, anal-
ogizing it to mandatory drug testing of persons working in some
state regulated fields.4 Maintaining that. the risk of transmission
was "minuscule," the court held that requiring employees to be
tested was not justified under the Fourth Amendment.42
B. Mandatory Drug Testing of Employees in State Regulated Fields
When balancing the government's interest against the intrusion
on individual privacy in the context of AIDS testing of health care
workers, an analogy has been made to mandatory drug testing of
employees in state regulated areas. Courts addressing the validity
of mandatory drug testing have found a compelling state interest
in deterring drug use among employees in potentially dangerous
jobs.43 Courts have upheld such testing, concluding that the intru-
39 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989). See generally Melton, infra
note 45, at 871 (describing balancing test used in Glover).
40 Glover, 867 F.2d at 462. The purpose of requiring AIDS testing as part of a disease
control policy was to create "a safe work environment for all developmentally disabled
persons receiving services from the [a]gency." Id.
"' Id. at 463. For a discussion of cases upholding mandatory drug testing, see infra note
43.
42 Glover, 867 F.2d at 464. Although the court recognized the severity of the disease at
which the testing was aimed, they nevertheless held that such testing would violate the
Fourth Amendment due to the low risk of transmission. Id.
" See, e.g., Railway Labor, 489 U.S. at 628 (train operators carry out duties fraught with
risk of injury); Hartness v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (government employ-
ees with "secret" national security clearances), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2896 (1991); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local 1245 v. Skinner, 913 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th Cir.
1990) (pipeline workers who work with hazardous substances); Bluestein v. Skinner, 908
F.2d 451, 455 (9th Cir. 1990) (workers in "safety sensitive" positions), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 954 (1991); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884, 889-93
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (transportation employees), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990); National
Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (civilian employees
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sion on the individual's privacy caused by the search is not sub-
stantial in light of the governmental interest in protecting the
public."
of Army in aviation, police/guard and direct service staff program), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
865 (1990); Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113, 115 (4th Cir. 1989) (employees at chemical
weapons plant): Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Justice De-
partment employees with "top secret" clearance), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 865 (1990); Jones
v. Jenkins 878 F.2d 1476, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (school bus attendant transporting handi-
capped children); Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557, 1558 (1st Cir.) (police officers), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 404 (1989); Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, Local 318 v. Township of
Wash., 850 F.2d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989); Rush-
ton v. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 567 (8th Cir. 1988) (nuclear power
plant employees): McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308-09 (8th Cir. 1987) (correc-
tional officers): Moxley v. Regional Transit Serv., 722 F. Supp. 977, 982 (W.D.N.Y. 1989)
(regional transit authority employees). Contra American Postal Workers Union v. Frank,
725 F. Supp. 87, 90 (D. Mass. 1989) (United States Postal Services needed individualized
suspicion to require employees to submit to drug tests because it is not highly regulated
industry, and safety concerns are not as compelling).
An initial inquiry in employee drug testing cases is whether a warrant is required. See
Railway Labor, 489 U.S. at 619. Although the general rule is that a search and seizure must
be accompanied by a judicial warrant issued upon reasonable cause, exceptions are made in
certain well-defined circumstances. Id. In Railway Labor, the Court concluded that requir-
ing the issuance of warrants would be impractical since supervisors often have no experi-
ence with warrants. Id. at 623; see also New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987)
(allowing warrantless search when: 1) substantial state interest justifies regulatory scheme;
2) inspection is necessary for regulatory scheme; and 3) application of regulatory scheme
must be certain and uniform); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (exigent
circumstances exception) (citing Treasury Employees, 489 U.S. at 665-66).
The courts apply a balancing test in mandatory drug testing. See International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292, 1299 (9th Cir. 1991). The Teamster
court balanced the commercial truck drivers' privacy interests against the government's
interest in deterring drug use by these employees. In determining the practicality of a war-
rant requirement, the court factored in the standardized nature of the drug testing and the
minimal discretion of the administrators, which decreased the risk of discrimination. Id.; see
also Railway Labor, 489 U.S. at 629 n.9. The Railway Labor court explicitly rejected the
notion that the constitutionality of a drug testing program turns upon the availability of
less intrusive means to achieve the agency's goals. Id. The state's interest is not reduced
when a less intrusive means of promoting safety and deterring drug use exists, or evidence
of a prevalent drug abuse problem is lacking. Id. at 674-75. The Court reasoned that the
state need only show that it had a reasonable basis for concern. Id.; Teamsters v. Depart-
ment of Transp., 932 F.2d at 1302 (Federal Highway's reasonable basis for drug testing
was its deterrent effect); Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 456 ("the [Custom] Service's policy of deter-
ring drug users from seeking . . . promotions cannot be deemed unreasonable") (quoting
Treasury Employees, 489 U.S. at 673).
Employers have offered additional justification for mandatory drug testing. See, e.g., Tay-
lor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1200-01 (7th Cir. 1989) (Department of Corrections
claimed drug testing fostered public's perception of employees' integrity; maintained physi-
cal fitness of employees; prevented correctional officers from smuggling drugs to
prisoners).
" See Railway Labor, 489 U.S. at 624-25 (government's interest outweighs intrusion on
Railway employees' privacy because they "have long been a principal focus of regulatory
concern") Treasury Employees, 489 U.S. at 671 (individual's privacy is decreased because of
369
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 7: 359, 1991
It is submitted that in applying the Fourth Amendment,
mandatory AIDS testing of health care workers is distinguishable
from mandatory drug testing of government employees. The most
obvious distinction is that using drugs is illegal while having AIDS
is not, and the government's interest in deterring the former is
substantial.45 Moreover, mandatory drug testing has a higher util-
ity than AIDS testing because of its inherent deterrent effect."
Finally, the government's interest in controlling work-related im-
pairment of employees in safety sensitive positions is more com-
pelling than in requiring AIDS testing, because the risk of public
harm caused by a worker affected by drugs is much greater than
the minimal risk of a health care worker transmitting HIV to a
patient."7 It is further submitted that AIDS testing of health care
workers is a greater intrusion on privacy than the drug testing of
employees in a highly regulated industry. Employees in such an
industry are often already subject to frequent physical examina-
tions and testing, and therefore have a diminished expectation of
privacy."' Since health care workers have never been subject to
such testing, their privacy interests are greater. 9
"operational realities of the workplace," and therefore does not outweigh government's
interest).
" Vicki L. Melton, Without Probable Cause: The Constitutional Ramifications of Mandatory
AIDS Testing in the Workplace, 57 UMKC L. REV. 863, 895 (citing Plaintiffs Memorandum
of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 48, American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees Local 1812 v. Department of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987) (No. 87-
0121)) (acknowledging increased governmental interest when activity is illegal).
46 Id.
41 See Lowenfels & Wormser, supra note 7, at 889 (discussing low risk of HIV transmis-
sion from health care worker to patient). At least one court has characterized the risk of
such transmission as "minuscule." See Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retar-
dation, 867 F.2d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989).
" See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (alcohol and
drug testing of railroad employees is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in part
because of their diminished expectation of privacy); National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (employees involved in interdiction of illegal drugs or
who carry firearms have diminished expectation of privacy because of "special, and obvi-
ous, physical and ethical demands"); International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local 1245
v. Skinner, 913 F.2d 1454, 1463 (9th Cir. 1990) (though pipeline workers have not been
"focus or 'regulatory concern,' " regulations concerning performance, medical fitness or
ability to perform jobs lead to diminished expectation of privacy).
"' See International Bhd, 913 F.2d at 1463 (identifying whether employees are already
subjected to testing as factor in determining intrusion of privacy) (citing Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989)).
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C. Mandatory AIDS Testing of Prison Inmates
Prisons have been particularly affected by the AIDS epidemic
because of the great percentage of prisoners in high risk groups. 50
Although the United States Supreme Court has held that prison-
ers retain such constitutional protections as freedom of religion, 1
freedom from racial discrimination," access to the courts, 53 right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, " ' freedom of
speech15 and freedom to marry, 56 nevertheless, prisoners do not
have the rights and privileges of free citizens.5 7 In balancing a
prison's interest in treating and preventing the spread of AIDS
50 See Shawn Marie Boyne, Women in Prison with AIDS: An Assault on the Constitution, 64 S.
CAL. L. REV. 741, 750 (1991) (high number of AIDS cases in prisons attributed to IV drug
users): Peter Rhodes Easley, The AIDS Crisis in Prison: A Need for Change, 6 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & PoL.'y 221, 221 (1990) (AIDS in prisons particularly critical because of "ram-
pant overcrowding, unsatisfactory medical care and the general lack of adequate response
by prison officials"); T. Hammett, Epidemiology of HIV Infection and AIDS in Correctional
Facilities and the Population at Large, 1988 UPDATE: AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 1, 9
(1989). AIDS cases'reported in 1988 in state and federal correctional facilities were as high
as 536 per 100,000 prison inmates compared to 13.3 cases per 100,000 in the total popula-
tion of the United States. Id. at 11. In New York nearly 60% of the inmates who died in
prison during 1987 and 1988 died from AIDS. Id. See generally Simeon Goldstein, Prisoners
with AIDS: Constitutional and Statutory Rights Implicated in Family Visitation Programs, 31 B.C.
L. REV. 967, 968 (1990) (increasing number of inmates have contracted AIDS).
" See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (constitutional rights of Buddhist inmate
violated when inmate not allowed to use prison chapel, write to religious advisor, or share
religious materials with other inmates); see also Goldstein, supra note 50, at 972 (prisoners
retain right of religious freedom).
5 See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333 (1968) (racial segregation in prisons
violates prisoner's Fourteenth Amendment rights); Goldstein, supra note 50, at 972 (pris-
oners constitutionally protected from racial discrimination).
" See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485-90 (1969) (prisoners have right of access
to courts, although prison officials can limit time and place prisoners. receive assistance
from others, and can restrict compensation); see also Goldstein, supra note 50, at 972
(same).
"' See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (prison officials indifference to
inmate's medical needs was cruel and unusual punishment violating Eighth Amendment),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974 (1977); see also Goldstein, supra note 50, at 972 (prisoners consti-
tutionally protected from cruel and unusual punishment).
"' See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) (prisoners retain some First Amend-
ment rights): Goldstein, supra note 50, at 972 (same).
6 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987) (restriction on marriage of prisoners
requiring approval of prison superintendent violates fundamental right to marry); see also
Goldstein, supra note 50, at 972 (prisoners have right to marry).
" See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (although prisoner's rights may
be diminished by exigencies of institutional environment, prisoner is not wholly stripped of
constitutional protections); see also Goldstein, supra note 50, at 971 (constitutional protec-
tions applicable to prisoners): cf. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989) (pris-
oner's incoming mail could be censored because of legitimate security concerns).
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against the prisoners' expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment, courts have generally found the prison's interest to
be paramount.5" Consequently, courts have upheld mandatory
testing of prison inmates. 59
It is suggested that requiring health care workers to be tested
for AIDS is also distinguishable from mandatory AIDS testing of
prisoners. Prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy due
to their incarceration while health care workers enjoy the full
rights and privileges of free citizens. Therefore mandatory testing
results in a greater intrusion upon the privacy rights of health
care workers. In addition, courts have traditionally deferred to
the judgment of prison administrators and have not required as
compelling a state interest in their analysis of prison cases."0 It is
suggested that since there is no similar tradition of deferring to
the decisions of hospital administrators, the state interest should
be held to a higher standard.
It is submitted that the rationale applied in Glover was correct.
1s Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584-85 (1984) (upholding practice of searching
inmates' cells and prohibition of contact meetings, in part, on grounds that courts should
defer to prison officials); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119,
128 (1977) (deference to prison officials accorded because of difficulties and complexities of
operating prison); see, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). The Turner Court
applied a four-prong test for minimum scrutiny which examined (1) whether there is a
rational relation between the regulation and the prison's interest in enforcing it; (2)
whether the prisoners can exercise their rights by another means; (3) whether allowing the
Constitution to protect the prisoner would adversely effect the employees, other prisoners
or prison resources, and (4) whether the prison administrators have other ways to address
the problem. Id. See generally O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987)
(prison upheld prohibition on inmates attending religious services on Friday afternoons as
rationally connected with legitimate government interest); Miriam G. Waltzer, Acquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome and Infection with Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 36 Lov. L. REV.
55, 66 (1990) (courts generally do not interfere with operation of prisons); Irene Lambrou,
Comment, AIDS Behind Bars: Prison Responses and Judicial Deference, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 327,
334-38 (1989) (Court's deferential treatment towards prisons); Goldstein, supra note 50, at
971 (prison officials may restrict or deny rights to inmates because of special nature of
prisons).
" See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1059 (1990) (mandatory AIDS testing of prisoners does not violate Fourth
Amendment); Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9, 10-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (segregation of
inmates with AIDS upheld). Contra Easley, supra note 50, at 227 (suggesting that Fourth
Amendment protection from AIDS testing is unsettled, particularly for inmates).
'0 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (while "hands-off' approach should not
be applied, "judgment calls" that satisfy constitutional and statutory standards should be
left to prison officials); supra note 59 (discussing deference to prison officials). See generally
supra note 58 (prisoners not entitled to rights of free citizens).
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The state's interest in requiring AIDS testing of health care work-
ers, based on the mere possibility that a health care worker could
transmit the disease to a patient, is not great enough. With only
one recorded case of such transmission, despite the fact that there
are thousands of practicing HIV-infected health care workers, it is
suggested that the state's interest could not reasonably be consid-
ered compelling. It is therefore submitted that mandatory AIDS
testing of health care workers violates the Fourth Amendment.
III. THE RIGHT To PRIVACY
A. The Health Care Environment: Health Care Workers
The right of privacy is "the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men.""1 Although the Constitu-
tion is devoid of any explicit reference to a right of privacy, the
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly protected the indi-
vidual's right to be free from unnecessary governmental intru-
sions in certain matters affecting individual autonomy including
marriage,62 raising children, 3 education, 4 use of contraceptives, 5
61 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), over-
ruled on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). "The makers of
our Constitution sought to protect Americans in their belief, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone
. .Id.; see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring). "[T]he right of privacy is a fundamental right emanating from the totality of the
constitutional scheme under which we live." Id.; Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890). "The right to life has come to mean
the right to enjoy life, the right to be let alone; the right to liberty secures the exercise of
extensive civil privileges; and the term 'property' has grown to comprise every form of
possession - intangible as well as tangible." Id.
62 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (law prohibiting inter-racial mar-
riages violated Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause because it curtailed right
long recognized as personal and essential to pursuit of happiness).
63 See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925) (amending Oregon law
requiring children to attend public schools because existing statute violated fundamental
right).
04 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (invalidating statute that pro-
hibited teaching of foreign languages to young children).
6 See, Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479. In Griswold, the Court acknowledged a 'penumbra' of
privacy inherent in each of the first nine amendments which they held to be applicable to
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 483. The majority concluded that the
Connecticut statutes in question, which prohibited the use or distribution of contraceptives,
infringed upon the plaintiff's right to privacy and were therefore unconstitutional. Id. at
485-86. The Court has also stated that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
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procreation,66 and abortion.67
In the context of mandatory AIDS testing of health care work-
ers, it might be argued that the right to individual autonomy im-
plies that individuals have the right to choose for themselves
whether to undergo testing. Despite the Supreme Court's reluc-
tance to interfere in areas which have traditionally been within
the state's police power-such as disease control 6 -it has recog-
nized constitutional limits on the exercise of such power.6 9
However, in light of the changing composition of the Supreme
Court and because the right to privacy is not expressly provided
in the Constitution, right of privacy precedents have been placed
on questionable ground.7 ' The Rehnquist Court has steadfastly re-
sions into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
" See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking down statute man-
dating sterilization of persons convicted of two or more felonies, stating "[m]arriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. ... )
" See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1972) (invalidated Texas law prohibiting
abortion, stating right of privacy included right of women to decide whether or not to
terminate their pregnancy).
Roe lent strength to the theory that "the privacy cases rest on the moral fact that a
person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole." See Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 778 n.5 (1986) (Stevens,
J., concurring). This self definition and its relation to "individual dignity and autonomy"
has been the foundation for the right of privacy since Roe. Id.; see also Akron v. Akron
Center for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 416 (1983) (invalidating municipal abortion reg-
ulations as violative of right to privacy).
" See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (statute calling for
mandatory small pox vaccinations upheld as reasonable exercise of state's police power);
Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378, 1383 (10th Cir. 1973) (mandatory physical exami-
nation and treatment of prostitute inflicted with venereal disease upheld); In re Halko, 54
Cal. Rptr. 661, 663 (1966) (upholding isolation of patients inflicted with tuberculosis).
The federal government has left regulation aimed at controlling the spread of communi-
cable diseases to the states. See Gene W. Matthews & Verla S. Neslund, The Initial Impact of
AIDS on Public Health Law in the United States-1986, 257 JAMA 344, 344 (1987). It may,
however, enact regulations "necessary to prevent the spread of diseases across states or
national boundaries" under the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 264 (1982). Id.
Apart from its recent legislation regarding infection control in the health care setting,
the federal government has exercised its power under the Immigration and Naturalization
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1970), to deny visas to AIDS inflicted persons. 42 C.F.R. § 34..2 (b)
(1991). See generally People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson, 134 N.E. 815, 817 (1922) (preser-
vation of public health falls within police power of state).
", See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (invalidated statute which
criminalized narcotics addiction stating that such addiction was an illness and to punish
those inflicted was unconstitutional).
7o See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989) (constitutional adjudi-
cation should not remove inexorably 'politically diverse' issues from legislative process);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (Court is most vulnerable and nearest to
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treated from substantive due process theories and has shown a de-
cided preference for legislative rather than judicial action in creat-
ing rights to privacy or autonomy. 71 As a result, it is submitted
that health care workers may have difficulty claiming that a neces-
sary extension of their fundamental right to individual autonomy
is the right to choose whether to undergo an AIDS test.
B. The Right to Keep Personal Medical Information Private
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized a right
to prevent disclosure of personal and private information. 72 The
Supreme Court has indicated that "cases sometimes characterized
as protecting 'privacy ' have in fact involved . .. the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters . . . ."'I In the
area of random and mandatory testing, courts have recognized a
right to keep personal medical information private.74 State regula-
tions mandating testing have been upheld, so long as the results
were kept confidential.75
illegitimacy when dealing with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in language or design of Constitution). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanish-
ing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 48-51 (1989) (examining Court's retreat from sub-
stantive due process theories); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 353 (1981) (criticizing Supreme Court's exercise of substantive due process).
" See supra note 70.
See Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989) (recognizing
privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters contained in FBI criminal rap-
sheet); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (constitutional in-
terest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters). Contra Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
603-04 (1977) (upholding New York statute that mandated reporting names of prescription
drug users).
7' Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605. The Whalen Court, however, did not deal with the broader
issue of constitutionality of disclosing private information. Id. On at least one occasion, the
Court has invalidated a restriction on abortions that opened detailed medical reports for
public inspection. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 764-67 (1986).
. " See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989) (chemical
analysis of blood or urine can reveal private medical facts and infringes on expectation of
privacy).
" See Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1528 (D. Neb. 1987)
(absent unauthorized disclosure of drug test results, signing of consefit form and submis-
sion of urine did not, in itself, trigger infringement of right to privacy), affd, 844 F.2d 562
(8th Cir. 1988); see also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
663-64 (1989) (upheld regulations requiring urine testing for customs employees involved
in drug interdiction wherein results could not be disclosed absent employee's written
consent).
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In evaluating cases dealing with disclosure of private and per-
sonal information, a court will balance the state's need for the in-
formation against the degree of harm likely to result from disclos-
ure. 76 It is submitted that a state, in determining whether to
disclose a health care worker's test result, should apply a similar
balancing test. The need or utility to the state of information re-
garding the health care worker's HIV status is likely to diminish
with the adoption of uniformly enforceable infection control
guidelines." It is suggested that such uniform procedures will
minimize the need for stigmatizing certain health care worker's
solely because of their HIV status. Further, disclosure of a health
care worker's HIV-positive status will often result in public humil-
iation and loss of livelihood. This potential harm evinces the need
for stringent safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure.
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
The Constitution provides that no state shall "deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 78 In
evaluating the viability of an equal protection claim, courts em-
ploy one of three standards of review:7 1 (i) strict scrutiny;" (ii) in-
termediate scrutiny;81 or (iii) minimal rational scrutiny.82
A. Strict Scrutiny
Under a strict scrutiny standard of review, a state has the bur-
den to establish that its action was justified by a compelling state
" See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 589 (1977) (balancing possibility of serious injury
against value of information).
" See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text (describing recent CDC guidelines).
71 US CONSr. amend. XIV.
71 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (naming strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny
and rational scrutiny as three levels of review employed in equal protection case).
'0 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (laws evalu-
ated under strict scrutiny will be upheld only if tailored to serve compelling state interests);
JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3, at 575-76 (4th ed. 1991). Under this
standard, a state must prove actual interest, that the interest is compelling, that the interest
is furthered by its action and that there is no less restrictive alternative way to assert the
same compelling interest. Id.
" See infra notes 94-95 (applying intermediate scrutiny in various specified contexts).
"2 See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing minimal rational scrutiny).
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interest.8 3 Strict scrutiny is limited in its application and is only
applied when a fundamental right or a suspect class is involved.
8 4
Fundamental rights have been defined as those liberties that are
"deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition." 8' 5 The right
most likely to be implicated in the mandatory testing context is
the right of privacy discussed in Part III of this Note." As indi-
cated in Part III, it is speculative as to whether the right to pri-
vacy will provide adequate protection to a health care worker
against mandatory testing. 7
In the absence of a fundamental right, AIDS-infected health
care workers may be entitled to this standard of review if they are
able to establish that they are members of a suspect class.88 For
strict scrutiny purposes, a suspect class is one which has been "sad-
dled with such disabilities or subjected to such a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of polit-
ical powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process."89 It has been suggested that
11 See supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing state's burden under strict scru-
tiny analysis); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 10 (1972). In
a strict scrutiny analysis, a state must show that the chosen action was the least restrictive
alternative, that the legislation was drawn with precision and closely tailored to achieve the
state's objective. Id.
84 See infra notes 85-87 (cases involving fundamental rights); see also infra notes 88-91
(suspect classification).
"' Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 198 (1986) (sodomy not fundamental right). The
Supreme Court has defined various rights as fundamental. See Argesinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 25 (1972) (right to counsel); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966) (right
to fair criminal trial); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (right
to vote); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (right to appeal criminal conviction).
" See supra notes 61-77 and accompanying text (analyzing right to privacy under
Constitution).
8 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (cases and materials discussing uncertainty of
constitutional right of privacy).
"8 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (suspect class
is "the target of ... prejudiced, thoughtless, or stereotyped action that offends principles
of equality found in the Fourteenth Amendment"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1972) (stating suspect class is one that has been "subjected to ...a
history of unequal treatment ... [and] relegated to a position of political powerlessness
In 1944 the Court held that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215
(1944). Justice Black added that "courts must subject [such restrictions] to the most rigid
scrutiny."Id.; see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (classifications
based on sex, race, alienage and national origin are inherently suspect).
89 San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 28.
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this standard should be applied only to review legislation which is
discriminatory on the basis of race9" and that a suspect class must
have had a " 'lengthy and tragic history' . . . of segregation and
discrimination." 1 Health care workers will have difficulty demon-
strating that AIDS victims have had such an oppressed history,
not only because the AIDS epidemic is a relatively new disease,92
but also because AIDS patients are not politically powerless and
have been given legal safeguards to protect their interests, includ-
ing anti-discrimination legislation. 3
B. Intermediate Scrutiny
If a group of individuals not entitled to suspect classification be-
come targets of discrimination, or if important, but not funda-
mental rights are threatened, an intermediate standard of review
may be applied.94 This analysis requires a state to demonstrate
90 See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"[T]here is no language used in the [Fourteenth] Amendment, nor any historical evidence
as to the intent of the Framers, which would suggest to the slightest degree that it was ...
designed in any way to protect 'discrete and insular minorities' other than racial minorities
.Id.; GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 589-91 (11th ed. 1988) (examining
Supreme Court's reluctance to recognize new suspect classes).
91 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(quoting University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978)).
92 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing discovery of AIDS).
9 See infra notes 101-127, and accompanying text (AIDS victims are entitled to federal
protection against discrimination); see also City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445. The Cleburne
Court rejected the notion that the mentally retarded were a suspect class because of laws
protecting them. Id. The Court held that "legislative response which could hardly have
occurred and survived without public support negates any claim that . . . they have no
ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers." Id. Justice White added that the
favorable legislation "belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice." Id.; The Supreme Court,
1984 Term, 99 HARv. L. REV 120, 164 (1985) (reviewing Justice White's analysis in
Cleburne).
1' See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (intermediate scrutiny applied to
classifications discriminating on basis of sex or illegitimacy). Intermediate scrutiny has also
been employed when legislation burdens a 'quasi-suspect' class or a 'quasi-fundamental'
right. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (gender classification); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (same). See generally Ray G. Spece, Jr., Justifying Invigorated
Scrutiny and the Least Restrictive Alternative Review: Civil Commitment and the Right to Treat-
ment as a Case Study, 21 ARIz. L REV. 1049, 1052-53 (1979) (advocating least restrictive
principle as independent form of intermediate scrutiny).
For contrary authority, where the Supreme Court has declined to recognize certain clas-
ses as quasi-suspect, see City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (mentally retarded); Matthews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) (illegitimate children); San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 28 (pov-
erty stricken individuals); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1090
(3d ed. 1991) (intermediate scrutiny protects classes with "outdated stereotypes" and "long
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that its action is substantially related to the achievement of an im-
portant state interest.95
It is submitted that mandatory testing of health .care workers is
not substantially related to the state's important interest in con-
trolling the spread of AIDS. Since the probability of transmission
from health care worker to patient is minuscule, testing such
workers will not prevent the spread of AIDS to any substantial
degree.96 A state's interest is further diminished by the unreliabil-
ity of current testing procedures. 97 A state will, therefore, have
difficulty defending mandatory testing under an intermediate
scrutiny analysis.
C. Minimal Rational Scrutiny
In a minimal rational scrutiny analysis, a state only has to show
that its action is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.9"
history of disadvantageous treatment"); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation:
Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1297-1305 (1985) (interme-
diate scrutiny should be applied to classifications based on sexual preferences).
91 See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461. "To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classifica-
tion must be substantially related to an important governmental objective." Id.; Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 816-36 (1982) (gender-based classification must
serve "important governmental objective" and there must be "substantial relationship be-
tween objectives and means"); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265-68 (1978) (classifications
based on illegitimacy must be substantially related to state interest).
91 Frances Taylor, Letter to the Editor, The Risk of Transmission of HIV From Health Care
Professional to Patient, 266 JAMA 1935-36 (1991) (citing Working Group of the New York
Academy of Medicine, The Risk of Contracting HIV Infection in the Course of Health Care, 265
JAMA 1872-73 (1991)). It has been argued that "basing widespread testing of health care
professionals on [a] single poorly understood cluster of cases is . . .both unjustified and ill
advised." Id.
" See Sheldon H. Landesman et al., Special Report: The AIDS Epidemic, 312 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 521, 524 (1985). HIV testing procedure is not completely accurate, for instance, out
of 40 million tests, 40 thousand will be false positives. Id.
Such false positive results would subject a health care worker to unnecessary psychologi-
cal trauma, stigmatization and discrimination. See Rasmussen v. Southern Fla. Blood Serv.,
500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987) (view of AIDS as "modern day leprosy"); Mark G. Pedretti
& Vincent L. Gallo, Jr., Note, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: The Case for Anonymous
Limited Discovery, 6 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1, 25 (1990) (devastating impact of dis-
closure of AIDS test results). See generally Joni N. Gray & Gary B. Melton, The Law and
Ethics of Psychological Research on AIDS, 64 NEB. L. REV. 637, 655 (1985) (disclosing positive
results "often concerns the most intimate and embarrassing details of a patient's life")
(quoting Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)).
'0 See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976) (applying rational
scrutiny, court upheld state law that prohibited certain vendors from doing business in
certain areas).
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This standard favors any state legislation which advances a legiti-
mate purpose. 9 It is submitted that under this standard, states
may even argue that the public's fear of possible transmission of
the AIDS virus provides a rational basis for requiring mandatory
testing of all health care workers. It is argued that to enact legisla-
tion in response to the public's unsubstantiated fears is unwar-
ranted. Nevertheless, it is suggested that challenging mandatory
AIDS testing under this standard of review would be fruitless.
V. FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
Apart from protections guaranteed by the Constitution, health-
care workers with AIDS may also seek coverage under federal leg-
islation enacted to prevent employment discrimination. In enact-
ing guidelines, states must evaluate the applicability of these
federal statutes to HIV-positive health care workers. If a state's
guidelines conflict with the congressional intent of the federal
anti-discrimination statutes, the state guidelines may be pre-
empted and thus unenforceable. 00
A. Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The broad purpose of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is "to de-
velop and implement, through research, training, services, and
the guarantee of equal opportunity, comprehensive and coordi-
nated programs of vocational rehabilitation and independent liv-
ing."'O° In protecting handicapped persons from discrimination,
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides: "No otherwise
qualified individual with handicaps . . . shall, solely by reason of
" See Clark v. Jeter 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (at minimum, statute must be rationally
related to legitimate governmental purpose); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (same); The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, supra note 93, at 161-62
(same).
100 See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)
(state law nullified to extent it actually conflicts with federal law); Brown v. Hotel & Restau-
rant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 501 (1984) (same); Ray
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978) (same). See generally Joseph M. Nador &
Stacy J. Sussman, Note, Warning: New Jersey Supreme Court Has Determined That Compliance
With the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act May Be Hazardous to the Tobacco Indus-
try, 6 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 233, 238-43 (1991) (discussing history of preemption).
01 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1985).
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her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be de-
nied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... "102
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court, in School Board of
Nassau County, Florida v. Arline,' extended protection of handi-
capped workers under the Rehabilitation Act to persons suffering
from contagious diseases.0 4 In Arline, a school teacher, who was
discharged solely because of her recurring tuberculosis, brought
an action under the Rehabilitation Act.'0 The Court held that
persons with contagious diseases are not excluded from protection
under the Rehabilitation Act, relying in part on the intent of Con-
gress when they broadened the definition of "handicapped indi-
vidual" in 1974106 to include "not only those who are actually
physically impaired, but also those who are regarded as impaired
and who, as a result, are substantially limited in a major life activ-
ity . . ."'0' In determining whether the teacher was "otherwise
qualified" for the position as required under section 504, the Ar-
line Court took into account the safety and health risks involved in
the job, and found that she was indeed qualified.'0 8 Responding to
102 Id. § 794(a) (1985 & Supp. 1991).
103 480 U.S. 273 (1973). See generally Tracy Jackson Smith, AIDS and the Law: Protecting
the HIV-Infected Employee From Discrimination, 57 TENN. L. REV. 539, 545-49 (1990) (discuss-
ing effect of Arline case).
'0' Id. at 289 (teacher with tuberculosis considered handicapped under Rehabilitation
Act); see Frank W. Volk, HIV Positive Employees as "Handicapped" Persons Under State and
Federal Law: West Virginia Follows the Trend to Cast Aside Irrational Fear and Prejudice in
Favor of Competent Medical Evidence and Sound Public Policy, 93 W. VA. L. REv. 219, 238
(1990) (holding in Arline extended scope of Rehabilitation Act to persons with AIDS).
1"5 Arline, 480 U.S. at 276.
10 Id. at 289.
107 Id. at 278-80. The amendment reflected "Congress' concern with protecting the
handicapped against discrimination stemming not only from simple prejudice, but also
from 'archaic attitudes and laws' and from the 'fact that the American people are simply
unfamiliar with and insensitive to the difficulties confront[ing] individuals with handi-
caps.' " Id. at 279 (quoting S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., Sess. 50 (1974)); see 29 U.S.C. §
706 (6)(B). The definition of "handicapped individual" was broadened in 1974 to read:
"[A]ny person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such persons major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is
regarded as having such an impairment." Id. The Arline Court found that the definition of
"physical impairment" in the Code of Federal Regulations included tuberculosis, and that
the regulations defined "major life activities" to include working. Id.; see also Waltzer,
supra note 51, at 73. Because the HIV virus damages both the hemic (blood) and lymphatic
systems, and destroys the blood cells needed for the immune system to work, the HIV
infection is "indisputably" a physical impairment. Id.
1o8 Arline, 480 U.S. at 288. The Arline Court suggested applying the factors proposed in
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the argument that tuberculosis should be distinguished since it is a
contagious disease, the Court concluded that "[a]llowing discrimi-
nation based on the contagious effects of a physical impairment
would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of section 504, which
is to ensure that handicapped individuals are not denied jobs or
other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the igno-
rance of others."' 9 The Arline decision, although not an AIDS-
related case, was an important decision in determining how em-
ployees with AIDS would be treated." 0
In 1988, the Civil Rights Restoration Act codified the decision
in Arline by amending the definition of a "handicapped individ-
ual" to include people with contagious diseases as long as the dis-
ease did not endanger the person or others."' Following Arline, a
number of courts applied section 504 to safeguard the rights of
AIDS-infected persons." 2 However, it should be noted that the
the American Medical Association's brief which included: "(a) nature of the risk (how the
disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c)
the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities
the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm." Id.
109 Id. at 284.
"' See Panel I - Mandatory AIDS Testing: Public Health and Private Rights, 124
F.R.D. 288, 299 (D.C.C. 1988) (relating Arline to AIDS cases).
"1 David C. Wyld & Sam D. Cappel, AIDS-Related Dementia and the Treatment of AIDS-
Affected Individuals Under Changing Employment Law, 42 LAB. L.J. 204, 207-08 (April 1991).
In debating the extent to which others had to be endangered, the legislature concluded
that "the threat posed by the contagious disease must be a significant risk of transmission
or harm ... to allow for discrimination based on a person having AIDS or seropositive
status." Id. at 208 (citing Lawrence Gostin, HIV-Infected Physicians and the Practice of Seri-
ously Invasive Procedures, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32, 32-39 (1989)).
... See Martinez v. School Bd. of Hillsborough County, Fla., 861 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11 th
Cir. 1988) (segregation in school of mentally handicapped child with AIDS not supported
by "remote theoretical possibility" of transmission, and therefore violated Rehabilitation
Act); Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct. Cent. Dist. of Cal., 832 F.2d 1158, 1158 (9th Cir.
1987) (classroom teacher with AIDS is "handicapped", and "otherwise qualified" within
the meaning of section 504 of Rehabilitation Act); Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 685
(E.D. Pa. 1990) (plaintiff's removal from position as regional partner of Hyatt Legal Ser-
vices because he had AIDS violated Pennsylvania Human Relations Act); Doe v. Centinela
Hosp., 57 U.S.L.W. 2034 (Rehabilitation Act violated when plaintiff was excluded from
alcohol drug prevention program because he was HIV positive); Ray v. School Dist. of
Desoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1534-36 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (segregation in schools of
hemophiliac children with AIDS is not allowed unless genuine threat is posed to rest of
school population); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 383 (C.D.
Cal. 1986) (HIV positive asymptomatic kindergarten children protected under § 504 of
Rehabilitation Act as long as they do not pose significant risk to classmates or teachers);
District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 415, 502 N.Y.S.2d
325, 336 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (children with AIDS considered handicapped under Rehabil-
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scope of its protection is limited, since the Rehabilitation Act only
covers employees of a program or activity receiving federal finan-
cial assistance and government contractors.'
B. Americans with Disabilities Act
The recently enacted Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")
seeks to set clear and consistent standards to eliminate discrimina-
tion of disabled individuals.1 " Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, the
ADA no longer limits the scope to government contractors and
recipients of federal funds.11 5 The ADA will greatly expand the
itation Act): see also Larry Gostin, Symposium on AIDS - A Decade of a Maturing Epidemic;
An Assessment and Directions for Future Public Policy, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
Poi.'y 7, 31 (1991) ("The courts, moreover, have consistently held that HIV-related dis-
eases, including asymptomatic HIV infection, are covered under the 1973 Act."); Waltzer,
supra note 58, at 70-71.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act protects the following persons:
(1) those who test HIV positive indicating exposure to the virus but who have no
physical symptoms; (2) those who suffer from ARC, displaying warning symptoms of
AIDS: (3) those with AIDS who have contracted an opportunistic infection but who
do not require hospitalization and are able to work; and (4) those who require hospi-
talization or who are physically unable to work.
See Waltzer, supra note 58, at 70-71 (citing Dep't ofJustice, Op. of Office of Legal Counsel,
(June 23, 1986), printed in 55 U.S.L.W. 2009-10 (July 1,1986)). For cases holding that sec-
tion 504 was not violated by the discharge or segregation of an AIDS-infected person, see
Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820, 833 (5th Cir. 1990)
(discharge of nurse infected with HIV did not violate Rehabilitation Act); Doe v. Garrett,
903 F.2d 1455, 1462 (11 th Cir. 1990) (uniformed member of armed services has no rem-
edy under Rehabilitation Act), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1102 (1991); Harris v. Thigpen, 727
F. Supp. 1564, 1583 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (prisoners who were segregated because they had
AIDS were not "otherwise qualified handicapped individuals"), affid in part, 941 F.2d 1495
(11 th Cir. 1991);Judd v. Packard, 669 F. Supp. 741, 742 (D. Md. 1987) (prisoner placed in
hospital isolation unit while tested for AIDS was not protected by § 504 because no nexus
was shown between discriminatory conduct and specific federally funded program); Ameri-
can Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1812 v. United States Dept. of State, 662 F. Supp. 50,
54 (D.D.C. 1987) (limitations on seropositive and AIDS-infected employees of State De-
partment did not violate § 504 because they are not "otherwise qualified"); Burgess v.
Your House of Raleigh, 388 S.E.2d 134, 137-38 (N.C. 1990) (state's Handicapped Persons
Act exempts persons with communicable diseases from protection).
Ill 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); see Gostin, supra note 112, at 31-32. The Rehabilitation Act is
limited in scope to federally funded programs and generally does not apply in the private
sector. Id. In 1988 the Fair Housing Amendments Act extended protection to the private
sector, primarily in landlord-tenant relations. Id. at 32. See generally McNeil & Spieler,
supra note 36, at 1054 (public and private hospitals which receive Medicare reimbursement
are subject to section 504).
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. 1991).
"1 See Wyld & Cappel, supra note 111, at 208 (ADA is the "most far-reaching change in
employment law regarding the handicapped in almost two decades"); see also Kim F. Ebert
& Joseph M. Perkins,Jr., New Era of Employment Litigation: Overview of Americans with Disabil-
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protections from discrimination already provided under the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973. By July 1992, the ADA will cover all orga-
nizations with more than twenty-five employees, and by July 1994,
all organizations with fifteen or more employees.116
The definition of "disability" under the ADA is essentially the
same as under the Rehabilitation Act, and, it appears that it will
include persons with AIDS, HIV and AIDS-Related Complex
("ARC"). " ' Aside from increasing the number of employees cov-
ered, it is anticipated that the ADA's broader definition of "other-
wise qualified" individual and what is required from the employer
in terms of "reasonable accommodation" will further broaden the
coverage of AIDS patients. 1
ities Act; 34 REs GESTAE 318, 318 (1991). The ADA in its five sections covers disabled
persons in employment, public services and transportation, public accommodations, and
telecommunications. Id. Because the ADA goes beyond sex, race and age discrimination to
cover up to 1,000 kinds of impairments which are not as easily identified, case-by-case as-
sessments will have to be made by employers. Id. at 319; Peter A. Susser, The ADA: Dramat-
ically Expanded Federal Rights for Disabled Americans, 16 EMP. REL. L.J. 157, 158 (1990)
(greater coverage reaching more people); Robert Craig Waters, Ethics in Practice - AIDS in
the Legal System, 65 FLA. B.J. 61, 61 ("As the ADA gradually takes effect between 1992 and
1994, it will forbid AIDS-related job discrimination by all but the smallest businesses and
law firms."); Frank W. Volk, supra note 104, at 246 (Americans with Disabilities Act does
not limit protection given by state law or other federal laws to disabled persons) (citing
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, H.R. CONF. REP No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1990)).
"I See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (effective dates for different sized organizations); see also
Doe v. Ball, 725 F. Supp. 1210, 1213-14 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (members of armed forces not
protected by Rehabilitation Act), aff d, 903 F.2d 1455 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1102 (1991).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (West Supp. 1991) (defining disability). See generally Ebert &
Perkins, supra note 115, at 318-19. This article asks, "who is disabled?" and elaborates on
the three prongs of the disability test. Id. (citing S REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22-
24 (1989)); supra note 121 and accompanying text (explaining three prongs of disability
test).
"' See Wyld & Cappel, supra note 111, at 209. Under the Rehabilitation Act, a handi-
capped person had to be able to perform the essential functions of his or her job to be
considered "otherwise qualified." Id. Under the ADA, however, a handicapped person is
"otherwise qualified" if he or she can "perform the essential functions of the job," even if
through "reasonable accommodation" made by the employer. Id. It appears that the legis-
lature intended something different by "reasonable accommodation" in the ADA than in
Rehabilitation Act and Title VII. Id. Under those statutes, the definition of "reasonable
accommodation" concerned whether it was an "undue hardship" on the employer. Id.
In clarifying the term "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA, one commentator
has stated:
The ADA gives a series of examples which include "job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, re-assignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modifica-
tion of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modification of examina-
tions, training materials, or policies the provision of qualified readers or interpret-
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C. Recent Application of Discrimination Laws to AIDS-Infected
Employees
In 1989, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana in Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners of Hospital
District No. 1'l was presented with the case of a nurse who refused
to submit the results of an HIV test to the hospital where he was
employed.1"' His responsibilities in the hospital included "making
rounds, assessments, giving medication, both orally and by injec-
tion, starting I.V.'s, changing dressings, performing catheriza-
tions, [and] giving enemas."' 21 After being discharged by the hos-
pital, he brought an action claiming the hospital violated the
Rehabilitation Act by firing him based on a belief that he was
HIV positive.' 22 The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that
the hospital had violated section 504, stating that the grounds for
his discharge-non-compliance with the hospital's infection con-
ers, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. §
12111 (9)(B) Even with these examples, it is suspected that the interpretation of "rea-
sonable accommodation" will be the most litigated aspect of the federal civil service
handicap regulations, and for guidance parties will look to the earlier interpretation
of "reasonable accommodation" in the federal sector. A defense that can be made
by the employer is "undue hardship" and this will be determined on a case by case
basis, with the courts looking at the company's "overall size, budget and profitability
of the employer, and the financial impact of the accommodation being suggested.
G. Jerry Shaw & William L. Bransford, Americans with Disabilities Act to Affect Virtually Every
Employer, 8 American Corporate Counsel Association Docket 22, available in WESTLAW,
TP-ALL library, at *8. In determining whether a person can fulfill the essential functions
of the job, the federal civil service regulations give employers discretion in determining
what the essential functions are. Id. at *4. It would be an abuse of this discretion if an
Employer were to consider something an essential function which the present employee
was not performing. Id. Employers will have to have a written job description of each posi-
tion in order to defend themselves against a suit. Id. at *5; Jeffrey T. Johnson, The Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act: A Primer for Employers, 20 CoLo. LAW 473, 474-76 (1991) (effect of
ADA on employers).
"" 714 F. Supp 1377 (E.D. La. 1989).
120 Id. at 1388. Employees of the hospital were aware of the fact that Leckelt was a
homosexual, and that his roommate of eight years had recently died of a secondary infec-
tion incident to AIDS. Id. Moreover, the hospital was aware that Leckelt had gone to New
Orleans and had been tested for HIV, although he asserts that he never picked up the
results. Id. at 1383; see Waltzer, supra note 58, at 67-68.
"' Leckelt, 714 F. Supp. at 1382.
... Id. at 1385. The court stated that Leckelt had failed to prove that the hospital per-
ceived him as HIV positive, relying on the testimony of the witnesses from the hospital
who all agreed that "no determination had been made with regard to the results of plain-
tiff's test." Id. at 1386. The court further reasoned that if the hospital perceived the plain-
tiff to be HIV positive, they would not have repeatedly asked him for his test results over a
three week period before discharging him. Id.
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trol requirements-were proper."'
The Superior Court of New Jersey, in Behringer v. The Medical
Center at Princeton,24 applied its state discrimination law when a
doctor was temporarily suspended and later restricted from surgi-
cal privileges after testing positive for HIV. 2 ' The court found
that although the plaintiff was protected under the state discrimi-
nation law, the Medical Center had justified its actions by showing
a reasonable probability of harm to the patient. 126
It is suggested that although persons with AIDS may be pro-
tected under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, the decisions in Leckelt and Behringer demonstrate that
the protection afforded by the statutes is not absolute. As in Leck-
elt, hospitals can still discharge HIV-positive employees who do
not follow the infectious disease standards.'27 Further, as illus-
trated in Behringer only a low level of potential harm to patients is
needed to justify the hospital's suspension of health care workers
or restriction of their privileges.
It is further suggested that through the Rehabilitation Act of
'1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress intended
123 Id.
592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991).
I2B Id. at 1283.
2' Id. at 1255. When the president of the medical center first became aware of Behr-
inger's HIV status, all Behringer's upcoming surgeries were canceled. Id. at 1257. Later
the department's chairman recommended that Behringer continue his surgical practice and
eventually the board of trustees confronted the issue. Id. A committee was assigned to
investigate and found that "HIV positivity alone is not a reason for restricting a Health
Care Worker from [the performance of] invasive procedures on the basis of data currently
available." Id. at 1257-58. At this time no cases had been reported of HIV transmission
from a health care worker to a patient. Id. at 1258. When the full board of trustees met,
and in light of the committee's findings, they voted to require HIV-positive surgeons to get
the patient's consent before performing invasive procedures. Id. at 1258. The final policy
adopted by the board of trustees read in pertinent part: "A physician or health care pro-
vider with known HIV seropositivity may continue to treat patients at The Medical Center
at Princeton, but shall not perform procedures that pose any risk of HIV transmission to
the patient." Id. at 1260. The board also retained its prior requirement that a physician
obtain "written informed consent from the patient prior to the performance of surgical
procedures." Id. at 1260. With regard to notifying a patient that he has been exposed to a
health care worker's HIV-positive blood, the court addressed the additional injury of a
patient thinking he or she may be HIV positive but not knowing. Id. at 1265. The court
concluded that if Behringer were to continue performing invasive procedures there would
be a "reasonable probability of substantial harm." Id. at 1283. Instead of concentrating on
the probability of transmittal, the court balanced the risk to the patient against the value of
having the infected health care worker perform invasive procedures. Id. at 1281.
27 See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
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to discourage unjustifiable employment discrimination against per-
sons inflicted with diseases such as AIDS. Placing burdensome re-
strictions on, HIV-positive health care workers would clearly be
inconsistent with such congressional intent and should be consid-
ered by states in complying with Amendment 781.128
CONCLUSION
The Kimberly Bergalis case casts doubt upon one of the most
vital relationships in our society: health care workers and their pa-
tients. The low risk of HIV transmission from health care workers
to patients, however, does not warrant mandatory AIDS testing of
such workers or the imposition of severe restrictions on their
practices. Despite the tragedy which accompanies AIDS, states
must give deference to the constitutional rights of health care
workers and their protections under federal law.
Mary Carter & Pankaj Malik
228 See generally supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
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